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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the international community has both in theory and in
practice called for reform of the development process.' Development, it was
felt, would only be sustainable if an enabling participatory environment in a
country and appropriate accountability mechanisms of the country's government
were existing. Very soon, similar calls for participation of affected people and
their representatives, i.e., the local and/or international civil society, in
development assistance processes supported by international development
agencies, and calls for mechanisms in these organizations that would ensure
these organizations' accountability to the local and/or international civil society
were expressed.3 While international development agencies have introduced
innovations in terms of participation and accountability on the basis of their own
internal conviction that change to adjust to new challenges is needed as well as
in response to the external calls for reform, the recent demonstrations at the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund Spring and Fall 2000
Meetings show that in the view of many outsiders changes made are not
sufficient in an era of continued, even in some places increasing, poverty despite
a trade and investment boom under the new international framework for trade.4
This paper will, first, lay out the legal framework for "interaction" between
the Bank and civil society both local and international; second, describe the
evolution of such "interaction" in practice; third, assess the impact of local and
international civil society on the Bank; and, fourth and finally, share some
reflections on future developments for the relationship between the Bank and
local and international civil society.
I. See generally PETER SLINN, LAW ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES § vii-xx (Int'l Third World Stud. Ass. 1991), and the chapters on the evolution of (he concept of
sustainable development, participatory development, and human rights in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE (Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters & Paul J.I.M. de Waart eds., 1995).
2. See, e.g., Olusegun Obasanjo, Democracy and Good Government - Basis for Socio-Economic
Development (Lecture Delivered at the Vienna Social Issues Forum Oct. 24, 1991) (arguing that sustainable
development in developing counties requires both "empowerment and capacity building of and for the
people").
3. See, e.g. JAMES C.N. PAUL, Law and Development into the 1990s: Using international Law to
Impose Accountability to People on International Development Actors, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 1- 16
(1992), and KONRAD GINTHER, Participation and Accountability: Two Aspects of the Internal and
International Dimension of the Right to Development, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 55-77 (1992).
4. For details regarding the major changes in the World Bank's operations in terms of participation
and accountability, see 3 IBRAHIM Fl. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (2000).
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND
THE WORLD BANK
Under its Articles of Agreement, the World Bank5 was created as an
international development finance institution. Its purposes are to finance the
economic and social development of its borrowing members.6 It is prohibited
from taking political considerations into account in its lending decisions.7 The
Bank finances development by primarily making loans and guarantees for
specific programs and projects to member governments.8 When it makes a loan
or gives a guarantee on repayment of a loan to a private business, i.e., a
borrower or recipient of a guarantee other than a member government, an
additional guarantee by the government in whose territory the project to be
financed is located is required.9
In essence, the Bank's operations may be described as the Bank's entering
into contractual relations with borrowing member governments, or with private
business provided the member government in whose territory the project will
be executed supports this contract through a guarantee. In practice, the vast
majority of Bank operations consist of loans to borrowing member
governments.
The Bank's charter explicitly provides for "[d]ealings between members,
i.e., the members' treasury, central bank, stabilization fund or other similar
fiscal agency" for the entering into loan and guarantee contracts With the
5. The term World Bank is used here to mean the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), unless the context indicates
otherwise.
6. In the words of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the Bank's express purposes are to "facilitate
the investment of capital for productive purposes," "to promote private foreign investment for productive
purposes," and to "encourage international investment for the development of the productive resources of
members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their
territories." See IBRD's Articles of Agreement, art. I, available at
http://www.worldbanl.org/htmllextdrlbackgrdlibrd/artl.htm (last visted Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter IBRD];
compare also IDA's Articles of Agreement, art. I, available at http:l/www.
worldbank.org/htmllextdr/backgrdlibrd/artl.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001 [hereinafter IDA], which, to a
certain degree, uses similar language.
7. The relevant provision of the Bank's Articles of Agreement state that "the Bank and its officers
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced by the political character
of the member or members concerned" and that "only economic considerations shall be relevant to [the
Bank's] decisions." IBRD, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
8. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. M, § 4, with IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 2 (limiting the
Association's form of financing to loans). According to its Articles of Agreement, the Bank enters into loan
and guarantee agreements with governments, (or any political sub-division thereof) of its member countries.
See IBRD, supra note 6, at art. V, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
9. Compare IBRD, supra note 6, at art. l, § 4. with IDA, supra note 6, at art. 5. § 2(d) (leaving
the requirement of a government guarantee up to the discretion of IDA).
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:399
members.'" The charter provides further that the Bank shall cooperate "with any
general [public] international organization and with public international
organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields."'"
Neither the contractual loan and guarantee related relationship nor the
cooperation with other international organizations, as envisaged under the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, include clauses on contracts with, or
participation by, affected people, local, or international civil society. No other
provision in the Bank's Articles of Agreement contemplates contracts between
the Bank with, negotiation of contracts with, or participation in the operations
of any nature by, people potentially affected by Bank-financed projects, or local
civil society. Nor is cooperation with civil society in other respects envisaged.
From the supervisory perspective of Bank operations (or the perspective of
checks and balances between Bank Management and the Board of Executive
Directors which supervises Management in the realization of the Bank's
operations), no possibility of, or requirement for, people from borrowing
countries or civil society to participate in this supervision by the Board of
Executive Directors of Management is envisaged by the Articles of Agreement.
Im. EVOLUTION OF "INTERACTION" BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE BANK
IN PRACTICE
Despite the silence of the Bank's charter regarding participation of civil
society in the Bank's work or accountability by the Bank to civil society,
participation of and accountability vis-a-vis civil society has evolved over the
years. Thus, while no voice has been contemplated for civil society according
to the Bretton Woods Agreement under which the Bank was created in the
1940s, civil society, by now, has a voice in the Bank's activities. The voice
given to civil society in practice does, however, not yet reach as far as scholars
and parts of civil society have called for; its overall scope, nevertheless, is quite
remarkable.
Participation of civil society exists in many areas of Bank operations and
keeps expanding although it takes the form of "meaningful consultation" rather
than participation in the sense of vesting full or partial powers of decision-
making in civil society.12 It does not mean negotiation and does not imply a
10. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. I11, § 2. Article V, Section 2(c) of IDA's Articles of Agreement
provide that IDA can provide financing to a member, the government of a territory included within the
Association's membership, a public or private entity in the territories of a member or members, or to a public
international or regional organization, implying that contacts by IDA can go beyond government bodies.
II. id. at art. IV, § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.




priori acceptance of the views of the consulted civil society.13 Similarly,
accountability mechanisms developed in the Bank's context do not go as far as
outsiders ask for, i.e., they do not enable civil society to ask for redress or
remedy of harm it has either suffered itself, or asks for on behalf of people
adversely affected by development projects. 14
A. Participation of Civil Society in the Bank's Work
Since the 1980s, participation of civil society has been made possible and
has, in some instances, even been made mandatory in connection with project-
lending by the Bank. 5 For several years now, it has been part of the policy-
making process. It further, since recently, exists in the context of adjustment-
lending. It is also part of the policy-dialogue, i.e., the dialogue on medium-and
long-term lending program, in which the Bank engages in with its borrowing
member governments. Finally, further informal dialogue with NGOs and civil
society with the Bank is evolving in conjunction with events organized by the
Bank, e.g. seminars on research and policy evaluation, the Bank/Fund joint
Board of Governors' meetings, and sector strategy paper formulation.
The Bank has built participation into the so-called project cycle which
characterizes its lending activities for development.' 6 The project cycle consists
of several stages: 1) selection of the project to be financed; 2) design and
preparation of the selected project; 3) appraisal of the project (plus following
approval of the loan financing the project); 4) implementation of the approved
project; 5) supervision of the project's implementation; and 6) evaluation of the
project. Each, the Bank and the borrower, has a specific role in the project
cycle. The selection of the project is both the Bank's and the borrower's task.
Design and preparation of the project is the borrower's responsibility. Appraisal
of the project is done by the Bank. Implementation of the project is the
borrower's responsibility while the supervision of the implementation rests with
the Bank as well as project evaluation.
13. Id.
14. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE 237-42 (2nd
ed. 2000). See also SABINE SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE, The World Bank, Its Operations and Its Inspection Panel,
45 Recht der Interationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 352-59 (1998); 2 THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:
ACCOUNTABILITY TO NON-STATE ACTORS, TRANSLEX, no. 1 (Apr. 1999); THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL: A MODEL FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL IssuEs 483, 506-511 (HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER eds., 2000) (all
discussing the distinction between the concepts of accountability, liability, and international responsibility in
the context of activities of international organizations in general and the Bank's work and its Inspection Panel
in particular).
15. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 97-101 (2000)
(describing the evolution of the Bank's participatory approach to project lending).
16. For a description of the project cycle, see WARREN C. BARUM, THE PROJECT CYCLE (1982).
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The inclusion of a diversity of stakeholders other than the borrowing
member's government is, according to Bank policies which bind Bank staff and
which bind also the borrower after their incorporation into loan agreements,
made an obligation at particularly two stages of the project cycle, i.e., the
preparation and implementation of the project. 17 As these stages fall into the
responsibility of the borrower, the Bank requires the borrower to ensure
participation of ultimate beneficiaries of the projects it finances.
For example, during the design and preparation of a hydro-electric dam
project, Bank policies and procedures require the undertaking of environmental
studies," the elaboration of resettlement plans, 19 and the identification of
indigenous people." Participation in the context of such studies and plans will
involve consultation with the people living in the area proposed as the
construction site of the dam as well as with local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to determine the environmentally most sustainable
framework for the project, elaborate appropriate resettlement measures, and
work out protection measures for indigenous people. 2' Again, during the
execution of the Bank-financed project by the borrower or its sub-contractors,
for example, a resettlement plan will have to be followed, people moved from
one location to the other will have to be compensated for any losses, and people
will have to be consulted in the course of the implementation of the project.
It may be noted that Bank policies on disclosure of information to the
outside greatly facilitates the ability of beneficiaries of projects, local and
international civil society to be involved in Bank's projects and offer their
views, especially beyond what the Bank is required to ask for.22
Participation of civil society has been for years a regular feature in the
Bank's formulation of new policies, its conversion of operational directives and
17. See SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 41-49 (discussing the legal nature and function of Bank policies
and procedures in detail).
18. See, e.g., The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies: Environmental
Assessment, OP 4.01 (1999) (standardizing a process in which projects to be financed by the Bank undergo
a specific assessment to ensure that the environmental effects of Bank-financed projects are discovered as
early as possible in the project cycle and that measures are incorporated to minimize, mitigate or compensate
for adverse impacts of the projects or to enhance their environmental benefits).
19. See The World Bank Operational Manual, Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.12 (1999)
(establishing procedures to ensure that the population displaced by a project receives benefits from it by
compensating them for their losses, assisting them with the move and their efforts to improve their former
living standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, or at least to restore them).
20. d.; The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive: Indigenous Peoples, OD 4.20
(1991) (describing Bank policies and processing procedures for projects that affect indigenous peoples to
ensure that the latter do not suffer adverse effects during the development process).
21. See The World Bank Operational Manual, Good Practices: Involving Non-Governmental
Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities, OP 14.70 (2000).
22. The World Bank Operational Manual, Disclosure of Operational Information, BP 17.50 (1993).
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other older instruments into operational policies and procedures, or the latter's
amendmentsY3
The Bank engages civil society in the review of its structural adjustment
strategies and has established a global network of civil society organizations to
discuss ways to improve mutual understanding of policy impacts on the poor
and explore improvements in economic reform programs.2 The Structural
Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), as this review is called,
was launched in 1997.
The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is the primary tool in the Bank
prepared for all borrowing countries considering lending from it. The CAS
report contains a description of the countries' priorities and the composition of
assistance required. It is prepared with the participation of the government. In
some instances, civil society, the private sector, and other country stakeholders
are consulted about the CAS contents before consideration by the Bank's Board.
In July 1998, the Bank's Board directed Bank staff to publicly disclose CAS
reports at the request of governments.
In the vein of implementing the Comprehensive Development Framework
(CDF), the Bank is also working in partnership and in a dialogue with a variety
of partners, including civil society.' The CDF, introduced in January 1999 by
the Bank's President James D. Wolfensohn, proposes a long-term holistic
approach to development. It acknowledges a country's macroeconomic
fundamentals but stresses further the importance of the institutional, structural,
and social underpinnings of development. As a process and tool for
development effectiveness, the CDF emphasizes strong partnerships among
governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development
actors working toward the goal of poverty reduction.
The growing rather informal dialogue between the Bank and civil society
beyond project-lending, policy formulation stricto senso, adjustment strategy
review, and policy dialogue (CAS and CDF), relies primarily on several focal
points within the Bank, e.g. its NGO unit to establish and organize a dialogue,
or its office for external relations. However, frequently, the specialized
networks in the Bank, when they feel this to be opportune, initiate themselves
23. For a detailed description of the conversion process of Bank policies, see SHIHATA, supra note
14, at 41-46.
24. Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Annual Report 1998 (Sept. 23,1998) (on file with
author); see also Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Annual Report 1999 (Sept. 16, 1999) (on file
with author).
25. See The World Bank Group, Comprehensive Development Framework, available at
www.worldbankorg/cdf(last visited Mar. 17, 2001). For description and analysis from a legal perspective,
see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank and Human Rights, 4 Aus. REV. OF INT'L & EuRoPEAN L
(ARIEL) 230, 252-255 (1999).
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the contracts with relevant specialized NGOs or particular parts of civil society
to receive comments on draft sector strategy papers or discuss research.
In conjunction with major institutional reform on new initiatives, the Bank
often receives unsolicited comments from NGOs and civil society, or engages
deliberately in a dialogue with outsiders. Such dialogue, for example, occurred
on the occasion of the establishment of the Inspection Panel itself as well as
Bank internal reviews of the experience with it. A similar dialogue is taking
place in conjunction with major Bank events, e.g., the joint Bank/Fund Board
of Governors' meetings.
From a legal point of view, it is important to note that participation of civil
society, i.e., mainly beneficiaries of Bank-financed projects and local NGOs
concerned with the projects for the purposes of the Bank's operational work,
and local and international NGOs when it comes to adjustment strategies and
policy-making, is defined in terms of meaningful consultation with civil society
before the Bank takes a decision on the financing of or measures for the
supervision of the projects it supports, or on the design of strategies and
contents of policies. That means that the Bank gives civil society the
opportunity to comment on projects, strategies and policies before those are
submitted for approval to its decision-making organ. Consultation in this
context does not mean negotiation and it does not imply acceptance of the views
of the consulted party or a mandatory influence (in whatever form) on the
decisions taken by the Bank. However, it means receiving adequate information
from the ultimate project, strategy, and policy beneficiaries and their
spokesmen, listening to them with an open mind and readiness to take their
views into account before the Bank reaches its own conclusion.
The organ of the Bank which is mostly consulting with stakeholders from
civil society is the Bank's Management. It is the Bank's Management which is
giving project beneficiaries and NGOs the opportunity to express their views
and concerns regarding projects and programs financed by the Bank. It is also
Management calling for comments in the formulation of strategies and policies.
Participation of or consultation with project beneficiaries and NGOs is thus, as
a general rule in the Bank's practice, tied to Management's work, i.e., the organ
which conducts the ordinary business of the Bank according to its charter.2 As
an exception from this rule, the Board of Executive Directors, i.e., the Bank's
principal decision-making organ, has recently also allowed for comments by
NGOs before taking a decision on the second review of the Inspection Panel.27
Nevertheless, whatever organ has listened to Bank outsiders, such listening has
always taken the form of consultations as any other influence on the decision-
making procedure of the Bank impairing on or interfering with the decision-
26. IBRD, supra note 6, at art. IV, § 10; IDA supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
27. For details, see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 196-199.
Schlemmer-Schulte
making powers of Bank organs would have been in violation with its Articles
of Agreement.
B. The Bank's Accountability to People Affected by Bank-Financed Projects
The Bank does not establish any contractual relations with the ultimate
beneficiaries of the projects it finances. It also does not take any actions vis-at-
vis them. Nevertheless, it can be the Bank's failure to comply with its own
standards, e.g. having failed to properly supervise the implementation of a
project that could potentially result in harm to people.
Before the Inspection Panel was established, people adversely affected by
such failures could, of course, write to the Bank's Management and ask for
appropriate actions to stop such harm but no institutionalized, independent
complaint mechanism for them existed.
To enhance the Bank's accountability vis-ti-vis project beneficiaries as well
as to improve the Board's ability to supervise Management, the Bank
established in 1994 the Inspection Panel.28 The Inspection Panel provides a
formal mechanism for people directly affected by Bank-financed projects to
bring complaints before it on grounds of the Bank's failure to abide by its own
policies and procedures in the design, appraisal and implementation of the
projects it finances.29
The Panel's role is in principle to be performed in two stages. In the first
stage, the Panel registers the request provided it is not frivolous or manifestly
outside the Panel's jurisdiction. Management, thereafter, has the opportunity
to respond to the request. Then, the Panel has to assess whether the request for
inspection meets the eligibility requirements of the Resolution." The main
eligibility requirements include that the request must have been brought by a
group of project beneficiaries from the territory of the borrowing member, that
it relates to a failure of the Bank to comply with its own policies and
procedures, and that harm for project beneficiaries has or is likely to result from
that Bank failure.31 A local NGO can bring the complaint on behalf of affected
28. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development
Association, The World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. Nos. IBRD 93-10, IDA 93-6 (1993), reprinted in 34
I.LM. 503 (1995) [hereinafter Inspection Panel].
29. The most detailed description of the history leading to the establishment of the Inspection Panel
and the most comprehensive analysis of its functioning may be found in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994), and THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2000).
For an analysis of the cases before the Panel and its first review in terms of their contribution to the
development of international law, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Experience with its
Inspection Panel, 58 Zeitschrift fUr auslalndisches Offentiches Recht und V0lkerrecht (ZaORV) Heidelberg
J. of Int'l Law 353-88 (1998).
30. Inspection Panel, supra note 28, i 12, 13, 14.
31. In the first stage, the Panel has to establish four elements ofjurisdiction, the first of which does
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people.32 In case local representation is not available, an international NGO can,
with the approval of the Bank's Executive Directors, bring the complaint.3 3 On
the basis of the eligibility assessment, the Panel recommends to the Executive
Directors whether to authorize an investigation.34
In the second stage, which takes place only after the Board authorizes an
investigation, the Panel carries out its investigation and reaches its findings on
whether the Bank has been in serious violation of its operational policies and
procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of the
project involved.35 If the Panel finds Bank failures in its investigation,
Management may propose corrective measures or the Board may decide on such
measures. 36 That latter decision is, while binding on Management, resulting
from the Board's discretionary power to supervise Management. It is not the
enforcement of a right of project beneficiaries to such corrective measures.
Management's own proposal on corrective measures is based on Management's
duty to conduct the Bank's day-to-day operations properly according to the
applicable rules.
It must be emphasized that the concept of the Inspection Panel is, unlike
the concepts of liability under domestic law or international responsibility under
international law, not based on the philosophy of legal action and remedies. 37
This means that the essence under the old maxim of "ubi jus, ibi remedium,"
i.e., that someone who has been wronged by another has a right to be remedied
not apply in the exceptional case where a request for investigation is made by a member or members of the
Bank's Board of Executive Directors: (i) the Panel's competence relating to the person of the complainant
(ratione personae); (ii) its competence regarding the subject matter of the complaint (ratione materiae); (iii)
its competence relating to the timing of the complaint (ratione temporis); and (iv) the admissibility of the
complaint in the absence of other grounds excluding the request's eligibility under the Resolution (e.g. when
Management has already dealt with the subject-matter or is taking adequate steps in that direction). For a
comprehensive description of the Panel's role in the first stage, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHHATA, THE WORLD BANK
GENERAL COUNSEL'S LEGAL PAPERS: 1983-1998 (2000) (The Role of the Inspection Panel in the Preliminary
Assessment of Whether to Recommend Inspection).
32. Inspection Panel, supra note 28, 1 12.
33. id.
34. Id. j 19.
35. The Panel conducts the investigation by checking pertinent Bank records, interviewing Bank
staff and other persons and, if needed, carrying out an investigation in the territory f the borrowing country
with the borrowing country's consent.
36. Id. 23.
37. For a detailed analysis between the Inspection Panel's accountability concept and the concept
of legal liability, see IBRAHam F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 106-15 (1994), and THE
WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2000). See also 2 SABINE SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE,
THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: ACCOUNTABILITY TO NON-STATE ACTORS, TRANSLEX, 1 (1999)
(discussing the distinction between the concepts of accountability, liability, and international responsibility
in connection with the activities of international organizations in general and the Bank's work and its
Inspection Panel mechanism in particular).
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and will receive an enforceable court judgment if he brings an action before the
court requiring the wrongdoer to correct the wrong, compensate the wronged,
or put him in the position he was before the wrongdoing occurred, does not
apply to the Panel. 38  By contrast, the accountability concept, for which the
Inspection Panel stands, is essentially not a remedy concept.39 It does not give
a right to remedial measures and it also does not provide for a corresponding
enforceable judgment. 4°
By contrast, the concept of legal liability under domestic law is a legal
remedy. Under this concept, an action could theoretically be brought against the
Bank by any individual having standing under domestic law on the basis of
applicable domestic law (e.g. on the basis of the law of contracts, torts, or lender
liability) in a domestic court.4 The latter would, if the claim is valid on its
merits, require the defendant to take remedial measures (e.g. pay damages or
give restitution). In practice, such action can, however, not be brought against
the Bank as the Bank is immune from suit in domestic courts with respect to its
operational activities and is not likely to waive its immunity.
42
While, like states, international organizations such as the Bank are in
principle responsible for any breaches of their international obligations under
an international agreement to which they are a party or an established principle
of customary international law applicable to them adversely affecting
individuals' rights, the establishment of any such international responsibility on
the part of the Bank vis-bi-vis non-state actors meets in practice insurmountable
obstacles. 3 There is in particular no judicial international forum before which
individuals could bring claims against the Bank for violation of international
38. See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank its Operations, and its Inspection Panel, 45
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 175-81,180(1999). See also AVERY LEISERSON, RESPONSIBILITY
IN A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 599, 600 (Julius Gold & William L. Kolb eds., 1964) (discussing
the distinction between accountability and legal responsibility and, in this context, pointing out that legal
responsibility includes the elements of an obligation, the breach of that obligation. harm caused to third parties
by the breach, and the duty to remedy the harm, while accountability does not include the element of liability
for harm caused to third parties).
39. See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 181. See also SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 241-258.
42. As a general matter, the Bank is under its Articles of Agreement and its Headquarters and
Establishment Agreements it entered into with the countries where its headquarters or resident missions are
located, immune from suit in domestic courts with respect to its operational activities. IBRD, supra note 6,
at art. IV § 10; IDA, supra note 6, at art. V, § 6.
43. For a discussion of the World Bank's potential international responsibility and the Inspection
Panel's role in clarifying some of this notion's complex aspects, see Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-
Schulte, The World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the
International Legal Order, 54 Zeitschrift fUr auslandisches offentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht (ZatIRV)
Heidelberg J. Int'l L. 392, 409-11 (1994).
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legal standards conferring rights on them even if a borrowing country would
espouse such a claim against the Bank.'
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE BANK
Participation in project-lending, adjustment strategies, and policy-making
has been introduced by the Bank on the basis of the conviction that broad
consultation with many stakeholders and their advocates enhances its
operations' impact on poverty reduction and increases its activities'
sustainability. Likewise the new accountability mechanism of the Inspection
Panel entertaining complaints by third party non-state actors over Bank failures
has been established in order to improve the Bank's portfolio performance.
From a quantitative point of view, it may be noted that the extent of NGO
participation in some capacity in the Bank's operations goes beyond fifty
percent of the operations approved every fiscal year.4" Over 500 NGOs are
participating in the review of the structural adjustment initiative. As of the end
of fiscal year 1999, all SAPRI countries have held national forums in seven
countries, organized by multi-stakeholders follow-up committees.' Local
NGOs in three other countries are conducting their own debates and research
through their involvement in a global NGO network set up to follow up the
SAPRI exercise. This process is expected to culminate in a global forum
sometime in 2000.4' Of the twenty-five CASs prepared during fiscal year 1999,
twenty-two (or eighty-eight percent) included some involvement of NGOs and
civil society.48 This represents a remarkable increase over fiscal year 1998
when only 20 percent of the CASs demonstrated an effort to reach poor and
marginalized stakeholders. Moreover, ten of the twenty two CASs prepared in
fiscal year 1999 provided details in the CAS report about the participation of
NGOs or civil society and included, for example, annexes listing consultation
participants, descriptions of the discussions, and findings resulting from the
discussions. As to the CDFs prepared in the twelve pilot countries, NGOs and
civil society have been involved in various forms in the CDF dialogue.
In response to a Board discussion on the progress made in the
implementation of the pilot CDFs, a "Questions & Answers" document on the
CDF was posted on the Bank's CDF webpage. One of the major concerns
44. See, e.g., JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PARTIES TO CONTENTIOUS
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) 141 (A.S. MUleret al eds., 1997) (noting
that the ICJ is not a forum for claims brought by individuals and discussing the various proposals advanced
during the past half of the century to change this situation).
45. See World Bank Annual Report 1999, supra note 24.
46. See WORLD BANK CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS FISCAL 1999 PROGRESS REPORT 20-21 (2000).
47. Id at 21.
48. Id. at 11.
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addresses in the Q&A paper was the ongoing involvement of NGOs and civil
society in the CDF process and in building effective partnerships. In May and
June 1999 a world wide on-line consultation was held. Many NGOs from both
developed and developing countries took part in the electronic discussion,
which involved about 800 subscriptions from ninety-eight countries."9
The Bank is also actively contributing to many of the over fifty different
global policy and research networks which combine NGOs with international
institutions, especially international financial institutions (IFIs), and private
business organizations or academic institutions and has received comments from
hundreds of NGO in its policy drafting (including the conversion exercise
regarding old policies as well as the formulation of new policies). Such
comments are also often received where the bank engages in institutional
reform, e.g., as mentioned earlier, on the occasion of the establishment of the
Inspection Panel itself and its two revisions. The informal dialogue with civil
society on the occasion of the recent Spring and Fall 2000 meetings of the
Board of Governors of the Bank and the Fund has increased as well.
The accountability mechanism of the Inspection Panel has been frequently
used. The Panel opened for business in 1994. By October 15, 2000, it had
received twenty-one requests for inspection. Three of these requests fell clearly
outside the Panel's mandate and were, therefore, not registered. Of the other
eighteen requests, seventeen were either brought by local people allegedly
adversely affected by Bank failures in connection with the Bank-financed
projects and their local NGO representatives, or by local NGOs on behalf of
affected peoples whose names and identities were often asked to be kept
confidential and not to be disclosed for fear of potential reprisals. One request
was submitted by an international NGO headquartered in the United States on
behalf of people in a borrowing member country to whom local representation
was not available.
From a qualitative point of view, the impact of civil society, and especially
NGOs, is harder to measure. 50 However, some concrete examples are showing
that participation of and accountability to civil society can indeed have a great
impact.
Participation of civil society can in particular change the project,
adjustment strategy, or policy design. It can be a contributory factor for Bank
activity. It can even be the major catalyst for a Bank activity in cases where
such activity would not have been undertaken but for civil society engagement.
49. Id. at 15.
50. In conjunction with its project-lending, qualitative assessments of NGO and civil society impact
is most advanced. Analysis of the Annual Reports on Portfolio Performance indicates that NGO involvement
reduces the risk of poor project performance. See also, e.g., Carmen Malena, NGO Involvement in World
Bank- Financed Social Funds: Lessons Learned (World Bank, Environment Department papers, 1997).
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Thus, the Bank's reviews of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel,
especially the second review, and the Bank's strategy to assist its borrowing
countries in eliminating corruption carry, to some extent, the works of NGO
comments/involvement. Most likely, the Bank would not at all have adopted
guidelines to help countries reduce harmful child labor, or would have only
done so later.
A. The Establishment of the Inspection Panel and the Two Reviews of the
Bank's Experience with It
The creation of the Inspection Panel was the result of both internal and
external demands on the Bank to be more transparent and accountable in its
operational work by providing the Bank's Board with the results of an
independent review of controversial Bank projects and, thereby, to improve
quality control in project design, appraisal, and implementation.5
Inside the Bank, the creation of an operations' inspection function
emanated from an internal review of the Bank's work following the appointment
of Lewis Preston as President of the Bank in September 1991. The report of the
task force commissioned by him, which was submitted to the Board in
November 1992 and which came later known as the Wapenhans Report after its
chairman, found, when examining the quality of the Bank's loan portfolio, that
Bank staff was often concerned about getting as many projects approved as
possible under the Bank's lending program.52 In such an "approval culture,"
less attention had, however, been given to the commitment of borrowers and
their implementing agencies to the implementation of projects and to the
supervision by the Bank of such project implementation. The task force
recommended a change in the Bank's policies and practices in order to improve
performance of its portfolio management and an enhancement of the role of the
Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) which carries out ex post
evaluations of projects after project completion. A subsequent action plan,
prepared by the Bank's Management in July 1993, in response to the task
force's recommendations, introduced new business practices and processes.53
It recommended greater participation in the design and implementation of bank-
financed projects by the people affected by these projects and greater
51. For a detailed account on the developments which led to the establishment of the Inspection
Panel, see SHIHATA, supra note 37, at 1-34; 3 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD ch. XVII (The
World Bank Inspection Panel- Its Historical, Legal and Operational Aspects).
52. See THE WORLD BANK, GETTING RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (1992). The findings of the Wapenhaus Report are summarized in GETrING
RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT EFFEcTIVENESS 1-7 (World Bank
1993).
53. See THE WORLD BANK, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: NEXT STEPS, A PROGRAM OF ACTION
(World Bank 1993).
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involvement of relevant NGOs in project design and implementation. It also
highlighted the need for the Bank's access, when necessary, to a reliable source
of independent judgment about specific operations that may be facing severe
implementation problems, such as an independent Inspection Panel. 4
External criticism of the Bank by NGOs and influential circles in certain
member countries with large subscriptions/contributions to the Bank's affiliate,
the International Development Association (IDA), no doubt influenced that
conclusion. The essence of the external criticism was that international
organizations including the Bank were not adequately accountable for their
activities and that they needed to be more open and responsive. The criticism
escalated in 1993 in the course of final negotiations by donor countries on the
tenth Replenishment of IDA and the call for the establishment of an independent
inspection function by the Bank was linked by the US to its willingness to
contribute to IDA."
Another major external pressure pushing the Bank to think about the
establishment of a special mechanism improving its accountability came from
the mistakes made by the Bank regarding a project in India, i.e., the Narmada
dam and canal project which was financed by the Bank to ten percent.5 6 Under
construction since 1987, the project was in particular criticized for not
responding to major environmental concerns and having greatly underestimated
the number of people that needed to be resettled from the submersion area of the
dam. The Bank, under Barber Conable, then President, commissioned an
independent review of the project and the commission's chairman, noted a
failure by the Bank to incorporate Bank policies in the project credit and loan
agreements and a subsequent failure to require adherence to enforceable
provisions of these agreements." While Management disputed some of the
Morse Commission's findings, it agreed with the thrust of them after carrying
out a further review.58
54. Id. 160.
55. Dick Thornburgh, Today's United Nations in a Changing World, 9 AM J. L. & POL'Y 215, 220
n.7, 222 (1993).
56. See Loan Agreement No. 2497-IN (1985) and Development Credit Agreement No. 1553-IN
(1986).
57. The Report was published by its authors, without prior Bank permission, as B. Morse/T.R.
Berger/Sardar Sarovar, The Report of the Independent Review (Ottawa: Resource Futures International 1992)
(hereinafter Morse Report); see also T.R. Berger, The World Bank's Independent Review of India's Sardar
Sarovar Projects, 9 AM. UNIv. J. INT'L LAW AND POL'Y 33 (1993).
58. See India: The Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Projects Management Response (SecM 92-849), June
23, 1992. The Bank-wide Resettlement review, initiated in 1993, was completed in April 1994. See The
Bankwide Review of nvoluntary resettlement 1968-1993, Report prepared by the Task Force for the
Bankwide Resettlement Review, Environment Department (April 1994). For the details of the further internal
review, see H. Wyss, Bankwide Lessons learned from the Experience with the India Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
Project, annexed to SecM 93-516, May 24, 1993.
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The above mentioned circumstances led several Executive Directors in
February 1993 to come forward with a proposal for the establishment of an in-
house inspection capacity for ongoing projects.5 9 Outsiders' proposals included
the appointment by the Board of a Bank ombudsman and another for an
independent commission with judicial powers, including the power to issue
binding decisions on the Bank." Because of the political support of these
external proposals in particular in the US House of Representatives in the course
of IDA tenth Replenishment, Bank Management moved toward the
development of a plan for the establishment of a standing inspection function.
After the discussion of various Draft Resolutions prepared by the Legal
Department, a final text was adopted by the Board of Executive Directors on
September 22, 1993.
The first review of the Inspection Panel was required by the Resolution
establishing it.6 This review took place in 1996. Along the process of the
review within the Bank, especially discussion of the issue in the Board's
Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE), suggestions from several
NGOs and academics were received by management and circulated to the
Committee which discussed these outsiders' suggestions together with
Management's and the Panel's suggestions. 62 The first review resulted in the
issuance by the Board of Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution
establishing the Panel.63  As to the substance of the 1996 clarifications,
including, inter alia, issues of the Panel's functions such as the two-stage
procedure (with the addition of a "preliminary assessment in the first stage),
issues of access and eligibility, outreach, composition of the Panel, and
disclosure of documents in the Panel process outsiders' views have to some
extent had. a direct and/or indirect impact on the Board's formulation of the
1996 Clarifications in a number of aspects.
59. See SIHATA, supra note 14, at 22-23.
60. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Why World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 14,
1993, at 13. See further David Hunter & Lori Udall, Proposal for an Independent Appeals Commission
(Environmental Defense Fund and Center for International Environmental Law, 1993).
61. Inspection Panel, supra note 28.1 27.
62. For a summary of the discussion on the occasion of the first review of the Resolution
Establishing the Panel and the results thereof, see SHnHATA, supra note 14, at ch. 4; see also Louis Forget, Le
"panel d'inspection" de la Banque Mondiale, Annuaire Franais de Droit International 645 (1996).
63. Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (1996),
at http://www.wblnOO18.worldbank.org [hereinafter Clarifications]. For a comprehensive analysis of the 1996
Clarifications, see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at ch. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the 1996 Clarifications
as an "authoritative commentary" the Resolution, including interpretations of notions in the Resolution and
flexible practices developed under it, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Experience with Its
Inspection Panel, 58 Zeitschrift fUr auslandisches iffentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht (ZaORV) HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 353 (1998).
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In connection with the Panel's function and procedures, the Board agreed
to the flexible extension of the Panel's time frame for ascertaining the eligibility
of a request as an exception to the general rule while not agreeing with the
suggestion made by some NGOs to eliminate the first phase of the Panel process
altogether and have the Panel alone decide on the eligibility of a request." The
Board clarified further that the Panel's investigations should continue to result
in "findings," not in recommendations to the Board on remedial measures
alleviating the project's flaws, or on overall improvements of the Bank's
policies and procedures, as suggested by some NGOs.65
In terms of access to the Panel and eligibility of requests for inspection,
Management had not objected to the suggestion of several NGOs to extending
access to the Panel to all affected parties, including a single individual. The
Board, however, declined to follow that suggestion." It also did not agree to
another NGO-supported suggestion which favored the extension of the
inspection function to requests submitted by foreign NGOs, local NGOs whose
right or interests were not affected by the project, or even to complaints
submitted in the general public interest.
67
On the question of disclosure of information, the Board agreed to make
Management's response to the request for inspection as well as the opinions of
the General Counsel of the Bank on matters related to the Panel available to the
public after Board discussion of these documents, as requested by some
NGOs.68 In the case of the General Counsel's opinion, the Board, however,
reserved its right to decide otherwise in a specific case.69 Regarding another
dimension of outreach, the Board decided that Management would make
significant efforts to make the Inspection Panel better known in borrowing
countries, as asked for, among others, by several NGOs.7° The Board clarified,
however, that the Bank would not provide technical assistance or funding to
potential requesters.7 '
The Board reiterated the requirement of the Resolution that "[t]he Panel
shall seek the advice of the Bank's Legal Department on matters related to the
Bank's rights and obligations with respect to the request under consideration. '
64. See Clarifications, supra note 63. It may be noted that the second review reduced the possibility
of an extension for the Panel to ascertain the eligibility of a request.
65. Id.
66. Id. (under the section of eligibility and access).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Available at http://www.wblnOOl8.worldbank.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (under the section on the role of the Board, following the emphasis in the clarifications that
the authority to interpret the Resolution was vested in the Board of Executive Directors).
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The request of some NGOs that the Board should have to separate legal counsel
to advise on Panel matters distinct from the Bank's General Counsel was
rejected.73 It was recalled that the General Counsel provided independent legal
advice to both the President and the Board on all matters.74
Controversies in connection with some requests over the decision on
whether to authorize investigations in these cases led the Bank's Board in
September 1997 to initiate a second review of the Panel. This review resulted
in April 1999 in the issuance of another set of clarifications of the Resolution
establishing the Panel, the so-called 1999 Conclusions of the second review of
the Panel's experience.75
Unlike in the case of the first review of the Resolution of the Inspection
Panel, the second review was in its major part concluded by an ad hoc Working
Group formed following two informal Board meetings on Management
proposals and Panel comments by Board decision and composed of six
Executive Directors (representing both non-borrowing and three borrowing
member countries). 76 The Working Group's deliberation took place without
representation from Management and the other Board members not chosen to
be Working Group members. The Working Group only heard the General
Counsel and the Inspection Panel before asking the corporate secretariat to
circulate its final proposal to all Board members and schedule it for discussion
in the Board. After the Working Group's proposal for a second set of
clarifications of the Resolution had been put on the agenda of the Board of
Executive Directors' meetings, the fact that a paper by the Working Group was
scheduled to be discussed by the Board and the text of the paper itself leaked to
the outside. As a result, several NGOs and academics criticized the Working
Group's proposal openly in the media and/or wrote to the Bank and requested
an open discussion of the Working Group's proposal with civil society before
the Board would take a decision on the proposal. In a move unprecedented in
the Bank's history, the Board invited NGOs and academics to send written
comments on the proposal as well as to attend an entire day session of
73. Id. It may be noted that historically, these are examples where the views of Management as
expressed in its response have differed from the views of the General Counsel as found in his opinion.
74. On the role of the Bank's General Counsel in general, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, The Role of
the World Bank's General Counsel-Roundtable of International Financial Institutions General Counsels, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 214-22
(1997). For an analysis of the role of the General Counsel in connection with the Inspection Panel, see
Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 63.
75. For a detailed description and analysis of the 1999 Conclusions, see SHIHATA, supra note 14,
at 173-203. See also Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Introductory Note, Conclusions of the Second Review of
the World Bank Inspection Panel, 39 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (I.LM.) 243-48 (2000).
76. For a comprehensive record of the events surrounding the second review of the Inspection Panel,
see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 173-203. See also Daniel D. Bradlow, Precedent Setting NGO Campaign
Saves the World Bank Inspection Panel, 6 HuM. RTS. BRIEF OF THE WASH. L AM. U. 7 (1999).
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discussion with Board members at Bank headquarters. This consultation with
civil society had its impact on several aspects of the text of the later-on adopted
1999 Conclusions of the second review of the Inspection Panel. While not
changing the essence of the Working Group's original proposal for conclusions,
some of the nuances later adopted in the final version of the 1999 Conclusions
stem from civil society's suggestions made before Board decision on the
matter."
The solutions to the following three issues were at the heart of the 1999
Conclusions. The 1999 Conclusions ended the unbalanced focus on assessing
harm suffered or to be suffered by the requesters in the first stage of the Panel
process and made it clear that the first stage is about the formal eligibility of a
request which lies in an assertion of both (i) non-compliance by the Bank with
its policies and procedures, and (ii) resulting potential or material harmed
suffered or to be sufferedby the requesters caused by Bank's failures. The 1999
Conclusions brought an end to the wrong impressions that remedial action, as
opposed to accountability in response to harm, was at the heart of the process
which had been nurtured by the Panel's practice to focus more on assessing the
harm suffered by requesters than on ascertaining Bank failures to comply with
policies and procedures.
The 1999 Conclusions also reversed the trend of the Management
submitting borrowers' remedial action plans after the Panel issued its
recommendation on whether to investigate but before the Board met to decide
on that recommendation, a practice that frequently frustrated the Board's
authorization of investigations. Submission of borrowers' remedial action plans
by Management at this point in time, i.e., not in conjunction with either
Management's response to the request or Management's response to the Panel's
investigation report, are now explicitly prohibited. Management compliance
plans may also only be submitted together with either Management's response
to the request or its response to the Panel's findings. The Panel's role with
respect to borrowers' remedial action plans will be limited to giving a view
regarding appropriate consultations with selected people and local NGOs as
such plans do not fall under the Panel's jurisdiction.
Finally, the 1999 Conclusions require a distinction to be made in
Management's responses and Panel recommendations/reports between (i)
failures exclusively attributable to the Bank; (ii) those exclusively attributable
to the borrower (or other external factors); and (iii) those that are attributable to
both the Bank and the borrowers (or other external factors). The earlier absence
of a distinction between the different authors of failures that contributed to harm
77. For the complete text of the 1999 Conclusions, see Conclusions of the Second Review of the
World Bank Inspection Panel, 39 I.LM. 232, Sept. 15, 1999 (reprinted after introduction by Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte).
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suffered by requesters had created the impression that the Panel would, in
addition to Bank failures, be investigating borrower failures. That wrong
impression should no longer be possible with the new requirement to distinguish
between different categories of failures as well as to design action plans
including proposals for corrective measures corresponding to the different
categories of failures.
The most prominent comments by civil society included the following
arguments/requests. Instead of the Board Working Group's original suggestion
on that the Board "will authorize an investigation without making a judgment
on the merits of the claimant's request and without discussion, except with
respect to the technical eligibility criteria," civil society representatives
requested that the preliminary review process requiring Board authorization of
investigations be dropped altogether, or Board approach of investigations be
deemed to be given upon submission of the Panel's recommendation unless
otherwise decided by a two-thirds vote of the Board. While the latter
suggestions were ultimately not adopted, the technical eligibility criteria were,
however, clearly enumerated in a inserted by the Working Group in its proposal
after meeting with NGOs and accepted by the Board in the final discussion on
the set of objective factors, with the expectation that, as a result of the criteria
being spelled out, the Board would indeed trust the Panel's recommendation and
allow it to go forward with an investigation without prior discussion on the
latter's justification in the Board.
Civil Society further requested that any remedial action plans (those agreed
upon with the borrower and those concerning Bank action only) would only be
adopted after the Panel process would have been completed, i.e., the Panel
would have submitted the findings of its investigation. Neither the Working
Group after meeting with NGOs nor the Board in its final discussion did follow
this request, but it was emphasized that what seemed to have pre-empted the
Panel by previous practice from going forward with investigation had been
taken care of in the Working Group report. Management, while free to adopt
a plan including corrective measures concerning Bank failures before the Panel
would investigate, would at the first stage of the Panel process only
communicate such plans on corrective measures to the Panel, together with its
response to the request, not to the Board, so that the panel would be given an
opportunity to judge the appropriateness of the proposed Management action to
address Bank failures. (Of course, Management would be in a position to take
corrective measures after the Panel would have investigated and then the
measures would be reported to both the Panel and the Board as the Panel's
investigation would no longer be impeded by Management action.)
Management would also be free to agree on remedial action plans with the
borrower. These plans could address borrower's failures; they would fall
outside the Panel's jurisdiction (which deals with Bank, not borrower failures).
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In order, however, not to subvert the Panel process through the negotiation of
such plans either, these plans would also be communicated to the Panel which
would have the opportunity to comment on the part on consultation with
affected people and local NGOs in the plan. And would normally be considered
by the Board only after the Panel would have undertaken its investigation. The
Board's final decision on this issue achieved two purposes: (i) the Panel's
original jurisdiction was confirmed, i.e., its focus on Bank failures; and (ii) the
Panel's function was nevertheless not diminished as it would be the Panel in the
first place to be informed of any remedial plan with the Board normally
becoming involved in Management corrective plans and borrower agreed upon
plans only after the Panel had the opportunity to comment on the measures
(albeit in a limited way only for borrower agreed upon plans).
Another proposal by civil society concerned the standard to measure
material harm suffered by people as a result of the Bank's non-compliance with
its policies and procedures. Outsiders criticized the Working Group's standard
to measure such harm on the basis of the without-project situation since the
latter would only reflect a "do-no-harm" approach while not pursuing a higher
standard of importing living conditions, a standard that should be more in line
with the Bank's genuine mission of poverty reduction. This suggestion was not
accepted either by the Washington Group or by the Board in its final decision
on the Working Group report. The standard of the without-project situation was
kept because it allowed for a more objective assessment of harm and avoided
evaluations in the abstract, effectively excluding unfulfilled and difficult to
measure expectations from the assessment. It was, however, added that it was
important to gather whatever baseline information might be available.
Another suggestion by civil society related to an unimpeded Panel access
to project sites on the basis of Bank loan agreements. Again, this suggestion
was not accepted but the final Board agreed upon text of the conclusions of the
second review of the Inspection Panel equally relies on a presumption of
unimpeded Panel access to the project site. This text leaves it up to the Panel
to decide whether it would need to visit the country in order to establish the
eligibility of the request. Furthermore, the final text of the conclusion states
explicitly that the borrower's consent for field visits envisaged under the
Resolution establishing the Panel is assumed.
Upon criticism from civil society as to the recommendation that the Panel
maintain a low profile during the investigation in keeping with its role as fact-
finding body and, so as to not create the impression that it might be
investigating borrower's failures, it should decline media contacts during the
investigation, the language on the Panel's conduct was changed. The report as
newly formulated by the Working Group after the meeting with NGOs and as
ultimately adopted by the Board emphasized the need to conduct the
investigation in an independent and low-profile manner. It further called on
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both Management and the Panel to limit their comments to the media to the
process, not the substance, of the inspection. Such comments would only be
made under those circumstances in which, in the judgment of the Panel or
Management, it is necessary to respond to the media (the final Board adopted
a version which slightly deviated from the Working Group version).
As a result of the meeting with NGOs, the revised Working Group report
added a new paragraph on "outreach," calling on Management to make
significant efforts to make the Panel better known in developing countries.
Similarly, as a result of the discussion with NGOs, the revised report stressed
the importance of prompt disclosure of information to claimants and the public
and, for the first time, recommended that information provided to claimants
should be translated into their own language, to the extent possible (final Board
approved version).
B. The Bank's Anti-Corruption Strategy
The Bank's explicit concern with corruption as a general development
issue developed from both internal efforts and pushes from civil society outside.
The Banks had long been concerned with governance issues78 but corruption,
which may be identified as part and parcel of governance, in the Bank primarily
defined as a country's efficient and orderly management of its economic and
social resources, had been a taboo.
When James D. Wolfensohn assumed the Bank's Presidency in mid-1995,
he soon asked the Bank's General Counsel to review all proposals and consider
initiatives for possible actions by the Banks to address the issue of corruption.
Detailed discussion of such proposals and initiatives at the senior management
level led to specific actions that were then approved by the President, and, as
needed, by the Board of Executive Directors. In particular, a comprehensive
strategy to address corruption, both as an issue of the Bank's own effectiveness
and more generally as a development policy issue, was approved by the Bank's
Board on September 2, 1997. 79 At all stages of the various steps the Bank
undertook to address corruption more explicitly, its internal discussion was
accompanied by receipt of comments and suggestions for a Bank strategy from
many NGOs (including Transparency International) and other parts of civil
society. A dialogue with the latter took place in particular along the work of the
Corruption Action Plan Working Group (CAPWG).
Even before October 1, 1996, the Bank's President, James D. Wolfensohn,
had referred to corruption as the "cancer" of development in his speech before
the Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, in the summer of 1996, an
78. See IBRAHIM SHIMATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 53-69 (2000).
79. For a detailed chronology and on a listing of the Bank's approach to corruption, see id. at 18.
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internal Bank Group task force, the CAPWG, was set up. It was charged with
working out a systematic framework for addressing corruption as a development
issue in the assistance the Bank provides to countries and in the Bank's
operational work more generally. The report came out in June 1997 after
lengthy discussions in the Bank's Policy Committee and was discussed in a
Board seminar in July 1997, then approved (as revised) by the Board in
September 1997. It provided a framework for addressing the issue by pulling
together existing bank approaches, suggesting new ones, and outlining a plan
for action.8° The framework was meant to guide the Bank in addressing the
issue of corruption at four levels:
1) Protecting Bank-financed projects from fraud and corruption;
2) Helping borrowing countries address corruption by responding to
specific country request for assistance in areas of Bank expertise
(including policy reform and institutional strengthening);
3) Considering corruption more explicitly in the policy dialogue with
borrowing countries, country assistance strategies, the allocation of
the lending program, the design of projects, economic and sector
work, and research; and
4) Lending the Bank's voice, knowledge and full support to international
efforts against corruption.
At the first level, the Bank had revised its Procurement Guidelines in July
1996 even before the report was written. Further changes were made around the
same time at which the CAPWG report came out.
At the second and third levels, the Bank has helped and keeps helping
countries reform economic policies and strengthen public institutions. It is now
also involved in explicit anti-corruption strategies, and raising the issue of
corruption explicitly in the dialogue with its borrowing members.
Advice on economic policy reform is the main pillar of the Bank's anti-
corruption work with borrowers. Enlarging the scope and improving the
functioning of markets strengthens competitive forces in the economy and
curtails opportunities for monopoly profits, thereby eliminating the bribes
public-officials may be offered or may extort to secure them. Markets, in view
of the report of the CAPWG, discipline participants more effectively than public
sector accountability mechanisms generally can.
80. See Report of the Corruption Action Plan Working Group Helping Countries Combat
Corruption: The Role of the World Bank Group (SecM97-548), dated June 25, 1997. See also Helping
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (R97-201), dated August 13, 1997, a paper
prepared by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) which is based on the report
of the CAPWG amending it in order to reflect the discussion on the Executive Directors' seminar on July 15,
1997.
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Further Bank advice considers institutional capacity building. Without
sufficient institutional capacity, well-intended policies can result in poor
outcomes and even more corruption. Infrastructure privatization, environmental
regulation, decentralization of government activity, tax reform, and public
expenditure reduction are examples of policy areas where institutional capacity
must be carefully factored into policy design. Building strong institutions is not
only a key to good governance and therefore to development, but also to the
control of corruption.
At the fourth level, the Bank strongly supports international efforts
including the OAS, the OECD, the European Union and the Council of Europe.
These efforts are an important complement to its country-based work, and
should become increasingly active as an observer, advisor, and/or participant.
C. The Bank's Child Labor Reduction Strategy
Until the mid-1990s, the Bank had not addressed the issue of child labor
as either a very prominent or a free-standing concern in its operations.8 With
the international community's growing awareness of the issue and recognition
of it as much pressing, the Bank's attitude changed. The latter change can be
traced back to not exclusively but especially several NGOs writing to the
Bank's President.
Before this NGO pressure, the Bank had addressed the issue of child labor
under some other titles, e.g., in the policy papers on women in development and
labor migration. The 1995 World Development Report (WDR), a major World
Bank research and vision publication, was also devoted to labor issues. One of
the WDRS findings concerned child labor and stated:
National legislation and international conventions banning child labor
have symbolic value as an expression of society's desire to eradicate
this practice. But they cannot deliver results unless accompanied by
measures to shift the balance of incentives away from child labor and
toward education. The most important ways in which governments
can shift this balance are by providing a safety net to protect the poor,
expanding opportunities for quality education, and gradually
increasing institutional capacity to enforce legislated bans.
81. For a comprehensive chronology and analysis of the Bank's approach to child labor, see Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Role in Fighting Child Labor, in UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY COURSE ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
327-342 (Eugen Verhellen ed., 1999).
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The Bank had further studied the question of child labor. 2 Despite of the
absence of an operational policy on child labor, the Bank contributed to child
labor reduction through its financing of projects for education, health, nutrition,
population and social safety nets. The Bank had also long recognized its
linkage to poverty and to the poor quality or availability of education.
In the mid-1990s, when child labor moved further to the center of the
international debate on the positive and negative effects of globalization and
several NGOs skillfully made the case to address child labor issues in a more
focused way in letters to the Bank's President, Bank Management, in the first
place the Bank's General Counsel, felt that the time was ripe for the Bank to
develop a more explicit position on the issue of child labor.
As a result of a growing awareness of the issue of child labor in the mid-
1990s and based on the conviction that exploitative child labor has a negative
impact on the economic and social development of countries, the Bank's
Management prepared in 1996/1997 a position paper on child labor (the World
Bank's Child Labor Paper). This paper was submitted to the Bank's Board of
Executive Directors for their consideration in May 1997. In their discussion of
this paper in July 1997, the Executive Directors agreed with the new approach
by the Bank to child labor issues, as proposed by Management. They also
agreed to the publication of the position paper with some revisions.8 3 According
to the position paper, the Bank's new approach to child labor issues includes:
(a) giving more focus to child labor issues in the policy dialogue with borrowing
countries; (b) improving partnership on these issues with other relevant
international organizations and NGOs; (c) raising the awareness and sensitivity
of Bank staff regarding the issues involved; (d) giving more emphasis to child
labor issues in existing lending activities; (e) requiring compliance with
applicable child labor laws and regulations in specific projects where
exploitative child labor is otherwise likely to occur; and (f) designing specific
projects or components of projects to target the most harmful forms of child
labor, possibly starting with pilot projects in countries where child labor is seen
as a serious problem.
Following the Board of Executive Directors' approval of the Child Labor
Paper, Bank Management immediately began to engage in the above mentioned
efforts and has, since then concentrated on mainstreaming child labor into its
work. For example, the Bank's credit agreement for the Silk Development
Project in Bangladesh, which was approved in late 1977, comprises covenants
82. Papers which were the result of such studies include F. Siddiqui & H. Patrinos, Child Labor
Issues, Causes and Interventions (World Bank Human Resources Development and Operations Policy,
Working Paper No. 56, 1995); C. Grootaert & R. Kanbur, Child Labor A Review (World Bank Research,
Working Paper No. 1454, 1995).
83. See P. FALLON & Z. TzANNATOS, CHILD LABOR ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS FORTHE WORLD BANK
(1998).
20011 423
424 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:399
requiring Bangladesh to make sure that contractors, hired by the Silk
Foundation (the agency responsible for the implementation of the project in
Bangladesh) undertake to abide by the applicable laws of Bangladesh, including
child labor laws, in their carrying out of the project. Similar provisions are
considered in other projects. An increasing number of further child labor
related projects are currently being undertaken by the World Bank.
Reducing child labor is a difficult task, involving a broad range of general
and more specific measures, from poverty alleviation to programs which
encourage greater school attendance. In order to incorporate the concern to
address child labor into the Bank's work, the Bank established a Child Labor
Program in May 1998. The Child Labor Program promotes a range of practical
initiatives to combat child labor and builds up knowledge on the topic. The
Program is housed in the Human Development Network and is the focal point
for Bank-wide child labor activities, projects and policy. The Program supports
various child labor and child labor related projects, including research, and
analyses, pilot studies, child labor reduction evaluations, and internal and
external dissemination through training, seminars and via the child labor
website." Policy implications derived from these projects feed into Bank
dialogue with clients and donors, Bank country assistance strategies and lending
activities.
Among major international organizations, the Bank was the first to focus
specifically on harmful or exploitative child labor when it began to discuss child
labor as a policy issue at the Senior Management level in Summer 1996, a
debate that resulted in new directions agreed upon with the Board of Executive
Directors in July 1997. With its focus on harmful child labor, the Bank
provided an impetus to further efforts by others with whom the Bank has by
now developed an extensive cooperation on the issue.
The World Bank's pragmatic focus on harmful or exploitative child labor
inspired and reinforced the debate in International Labor Organization (ILO) on
the adoption of a new convention similarly focusing on the worst forms of child
labor. Cross-fertilization between the Bank and ILO in the approach to child
labor continues beyond the adoption by ILO of the new Convention on worst
forms of child labor in June 1999. The Bank welcomes the new ILO
Convention's more substantive approach (versus its earlier, primarily formal
definitional approach to child labor based on strict age standards in the
Minimum Age Convention). The new ILO view on child labor corresponds its
own, from a general perspective, and is susceptible, in the more comprehensive
details of defining the worst forms of child labor, to even guide Bank actions to
combat child labor where the Bank's own position paper fails to give guidance.
84. Available at http://www.worldbank.orgtsp/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
Schlemmer-Schulte
The greater parallels in ILO's and the Bank's approach from a general
policy perspective have increased the opportunities for both institutions to work
closer together as partners on the ground. As a result, ILO with its IPEC
program85 and the Bank are working together towards a gradual elimination of
child labor by strengthening the capability of countries to deal with the problem.
Further partners of the Bank include UNICEF, the International
Organization of Employers (IOE), and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The scope of impact which civil society has on the Bank in legal terms is
reflected in the concrete meaning the Bank has given to two concepts:
participation and accountability. The later translate into "meaningful
consultation" with project beneficiaries and "accountability of Bank
Management to the Board triggered by affected people's standing before the
Panel" rather than "participation in the Bank's decision-making process" and
"legal remedies against Bank financing of projects." This does not mean that
the Bank has once and for all rejected broader concepts as those brought
forward by development scholars. It means that the Bank has been the first
international finance and development institution to courageously introduce new
processes and mechanisms while ensuring a legally sound basis for them as well
as keeping an eye on the practical feasibility of dramatic changes. The bank
remains open to further develop these new processes and mechanisms and
thereby contribute to the shaping of the features of emerging concepts of
international development law.
There are a number of things that have to be kept in mind for the continued
use of already existing participation and accountability structures as well as in
the further evolution of these structures in the future.
Involvement of civil society in the Bank's activities has in terms of
participation and in accountability terms always taken place on a legally sound
basis. It developed from ad hoc incidents to more institutionalized ways (either
in the format of established and repeated practices or by incorporation in written
procedures).
From a geographical point of view, the focus by the Bank was initially on
local civil society reflecting the traditional project-lending mode of the Bank.
By now, it has broadened to international civil society, especially in adjustment
strategy, and in policy matters.
85. With its International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), ILO is assisting
countries in elaborating and implementing comprehensive policies and targeted programs and projects starting
in 1992, with financial support from several governments.
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In substance, involvement took the form of consultation or assistance in
oversight through alerting the Bank where its projects were badly managed. It
never meant attribution of powers in the decision-making, as such an attribution
would have been inconsistent with the Bank's Articles of Agreement and the
allocation of powers to Management and the Board of Executive Directors
under the Articles. Any future developments should keep this limitation in
mind.
From a practical point of view, involvement of civil society in the way it
has so far been structured has not led to disruptions in the functioning of the
Bank and in doing its business. Inappropriate manipulations only occurred
when civil society made itself heard outside the established ad hoc and/or
institutionalized frameworks, i.e., contrary to the existing established rules of
the game or ad hoc agreed-upon new practices by those vested with the powers
to set the rules of the game. For example, undue influences were exerted on the
Bank when, contrary to the Bank's rules of the game, demonstrations in front
of the Bank took place and comments originating with civil society were
published in the media at the time the Bank's Board of Executive Directors were
deliberating and discussing the investigation report of the Inspection Panel in
the Western China Poverty Reduction/Tibet case before the Board had taken a
decision because the reports by both Management and the Inspection Panel had
been leaked to the outside." In the latter incident, the Board followed the
traditional model of decision-making process in the Bank and, unlike in the case
of the second review of the Inspection Panel where it had itself organized a
meeting with NGOs before making a final decision, did not want to officially
hear outsiders' views before taking a decision. For an orderly development of
consulting with outsiders, agreed upon procedures, i.e., the "rule of law," should
be followed. Furthermore, respect must be paid to limitations that cannot be
overcome by agreed upon procedures but would require a change in the big
framework through an amendment of the Bank's Articles of Agreement.
Beyond the rules of the game under the Bank's current framework, i.e., in
terms of future developments, or from a policy perspective, two issues are most
important. First, if one would like to accord civil society a greater role in the
development activities of the Bank and other development agencies, in
particular accord to them some decision-making powers, the legitimacy of such
a move must be scrutinized. Are international NGOs, for example, really the
representative of local population in a developing country, i.e., the ultimate
beneficiaries of development assistance? Or are they not merely self-appointed
spokesmen, frequently without elaborate internal governance structures and
without their heads being internally "democratically" elected, with the
86. See also Daniel D. Bradlow, Why World BankNeeds an Ombudsman, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1993,
Schlemmer-Schulte
exceptions of labor unions? As Paul C. Szasz, a fellow member of the ILA
Committee on Accountability of International Organizations has written, "[a]ny
discussion of the role of NGOs in relation to [international organizations] must
start from an understanding of what those organizations are " i.e., inter alia,
who their members and representatives are and who supports them, before
giving them roles in the working of international organizations. 7 The Bank has
started, in addition to involving NGOs, to analyze them but much more analysis
would be needed to be informed for further increasing NGOs' roles in Bank
activities.88 It is understandable that Executive Directors from democratic
member countries express great frustration over NGOs' participating in the
demonstration on the occasion of the joint Bank/Fund Board of Governors'
meetings as NGOs deserve less attention than Executive Directors or Governors
who, when coming from democratic countries, bring much more legitimacy
with them.
The second issue is of conceptual nature. Frequently, outsiders have called
for greater "democratization" of international organizations generally, and
international financial organizations in particular. Democratization, however,
is not only the wrong term but should never conceptually be asked for because,
unlike states, international organizations are not organisms that could within
themselves establish a self-standing democratic structure. They do neither
possess a territory nor a population to be looked after fairly, but have a much
narrower purpose to fulfill. The only exception here would potentially be the
European Union. 89 Thus, any call for direct involvement of the people in the
political decision-making process or their representation for that process as well
as separation of powers, e.g., direct participation by people in Bank decisions
or representation by them in the Board as well as establishment of an
independent court judging in cases between Bank Management and affected
people, or participation of NGOs in decision-making by the Bank's Board as
87. See Paul C. Szasz, The Role of NGOs in International Governance, WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW
RE'., Mar. 4, 1999.
88. See the work on putting together a Handbook on Good Practices for Laws relating to NGOs,
analytical work which was sponsored and begun by the World Bank in the mid- 1990s but has been abandoned
in the meantime. A definition of NGOs for bank purposes, however, has been formulated. See Good Practice
(GP) 14.70 Involving NGOs in Bank-supported Activities (1998) (noting that, in general, the interest of the
Bank is restricted to those NGOs that work in the field of economic and social development, emergency relief,
and environmental protection or that comprise or represent poor or vulnerable people). For further analytical
work and classification of NGOs as relevant for the Bank's operational work, see Carmen Malena, Working
with NGOs A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank and NGOs (World Bank
Publication, Operational Policy Department March 1995).
89. Even in the case of the European Union (EU), great care in the use of the term "democracy" and
application of that term to the EU has to be exercised. For a discussion of the issue of democracy and the EU,
see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte. The "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union Revisited, EUROPEAN
REVIEW OF PUBLIC LAW (2000) (forthcoming).
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part of involvement of people in the legislating process of the Bank have their
conceptual shortcomings.' These shortcomings should be kept in mind while,
of course, smaller goals for change to enhance the organizations' efficiency
such as further transparency and additional checks and balances can and should
certainly be pursued.
90. For discussion of the potential for a development of the Inspection Panel into an independent
court, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank Inspection Panel: The Building of an International
Grievance System, in LBER AMICORUM IBRAHIM F.1. SHIHATA INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
LAw (Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2000).
